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Corporate pension funds are the largest and fastest
growing pool of private capital in the United States today.
The total assets of these pension funds amount to over $125
billion, which exceeds the combined 1970 assets of General
Motors, Standard Oil (N. J.), Ford, General Electric, Texaco,
IBM, Chrysler, Mobil Oil, ITT, Gulf, and U. S. Steel. 1 Even
with this vast pool of capital in existence, there is con-
siderable doubt in the minds of financial, economic, and
government authorities as to whether or not these funds are
receiving the necessary attention, time, and management that
is commensurate with the great size and amounts of monies
involved. Historically, corporate pension fund managers
have been seemingly unconcerned in their handling of these
funds and extremely conservative in their use; being content
mainly with allocating the funds into investments that require
no involved management procedures or undue expense, promise
of a high degree of safety of capital, and only a nominal
rate of return.
Charles D. Ellis, "Danger Ahead For Pension Funds,"
Harvard Business Review, May-June 1971 » 50-51*

Table 1 shows the tremendous increases of both total
assets of private pension plans and total benefits paid under
these plans from 1950 to 1969. The recent trend of continu-
ally increasing pension benefits, plus the fact that close to
one half of those employed in the nation's industry are
covered by pension plans as compared to only 25 per cent
twenty years ago, is forcing corporate financial managers to
make the administration of a firm's pension fund a major enter-
prise within the corporate structure. In addition to the
increasing assets, benefits, and wider coverage of pension
funds, other factors that have contributed to the increased
attention to pension fund administration are the effects of
almost uncontrollable inflation, the institutionalization of
the financial markets, and the ever increasing concern for
public welfare by government officials.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The above discussion leads to the primary purposes of
this study; an investigation of the policies and objectives of
pension fund managers, what particular problems face these
managers, and, most important of all, a determination of what
degree the funds have been and will be successful in coping
with the discussed problems and increased pension costs in
order to fulfill their primary objective of providing suffi-
cient retirement benefits for beneficiaries.
Julian Gumperz, "Pension Funds in an Age of Discontin-
uity," Financial Analysts Journal , November-December 1970, 21.
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Source: Julian Gumperz, "Pension Funds in an Age of
Discontinuity," Financial Analysts Journal,
November-December, 1970,

The secondary objectives of the study are to give a
brief history of pension funds and what their purposes are,
to discuss how pension fund assets are invested and v/hat
investment performance has been, to describe the influence
that employees and labor unions have on policy decisions of
corporate management, and finally, to look ahead into the
future and to project the expected future role of the
federal government in private pension matters.
UTILITY OF THE STUDY
Why the big fuss over pension fund practices recently,
and why is the government getting more involved and concerned
with the administration of these funds? Pension assets and
funding are extremely important to this country, as well as
to business and employees. The obvious and desirable goal of
the government is to ensure that all elderly citizens are able
to live a comfortable, welfare-free life after retirement,
with private pension and government social security benefits
providing all the funds required to sustain an acceptable
standard of living. Besides the public welfare aspect,
private pension plans have significance, as far as the
government is concerned, in that they supplement the basic
public system and add values to industrial life not provided
by the Social Security system.

The steady increases in average wage levels and the
trend toward increasing pension costs will place extremely
heavy demands upon pension fund assets over the years ahead.
Therefore, besides having to be concerned with how the pension
plans are funded, financial managers are also vitally concerned
with obtaining maximum investment performance and rates of
return from the pension fund portfolio of investments. It is
an established fact that the most crucial problem faced by
pension plans is the achievement and maintenance of rates of
return of asset accumulation that can match the build-up of
liabilities the funds will have to meet in the 1970' s and
beyond. Additionally, certain government and labor union
pressures have been exerted on corporations that will eventu-
ally mean that pension plans will be required to not only
raise benefit payments for persons long retired beyond all
proportion to their earnings while working, but also to provide
benefits to employees who never participated in a pension plan.
Despite all the above factors which will increase pension
costs considerably in the coming years, a recent survey of pen-
sion fund management policies and practices in large corpora-
tions found that a substantial majority of the senior executives
responsible for pension funds spend only a small portion of
their time on pension policy and strategy, and make no long-
term forecasts of either future benefits or the future contribu-
ption that their companies will have to pay into their funds.
y
1Ibid. , 20.
2Ellis, "Danger Ahead," 50-51.

The results of this survey point up the fact that if there is
any single critical need in the pension and profit sharing
business it is for competent, conscientious, and responsible
money management.
Faced with these increased demands, companies have
essentially two ways of obtaining the funds required for future
benefits. They can either contribute greater amounts out of
corporate earnings, or attempt to increase the asset values by
more aggressive investments in common stocks and bonds. Most
companies have chosen to do the latter, and therefore have
inadvertently been drawn into the performance race that has
been the by-word of many mutual funds for so many years. As
long as the economy and the stock market are performing well,
the pension funds are not under any particular pressures,
internally or externally. However, the ravages of the bear
market of 1969 and 1970 have caused a substantial loss in
market value of the assets of thousands of pension funds.
Under these conditions, corporate operations are affected by
the erosion of pension fund value in two separate ways: (.1,)
in the annual cash contributions to the fund that will be
required, and (2) in the effect on earnings per share of the
accrual of pension costs. In any year pension costs are a
Partners at Neuberger and Berman, Investment Firm,
interview on "Pension Portfolio Management," Pension and
Welfare News , February, 1971, 4-5.
2Darrell J. Croot, "Coping With the Decline of Asset
Values in Pension Funds," Financial Executive , November, 1970,
20.

major expense for a company, but what is devastating to a
company is to be forced to pay more into pension funds during
poor economic conditions and bear markets, just at the time
when corporate profits are usually decreasing.
Since companies do not have to reveal investment per-
formance figures, there is no real way of knowing how well
individual company funds have weathered the bear markets and
to what extent it has affected corporate operations. Addition-
ally, comparing rates of return for different companies is
equally difficult because objectives, responsibilities, and
consequences of investment failure are different for each
corporation. What might be a satisfactory return for one
program may be highly unsatisfactory for another. Nevertheless,
maximum portfolio performance, but always within the framework
of the constraints upon a particular fund, must be the aim of
all fund managers, whether or not the results are published.
The basic questions that are being frequently asked of
private pension funds are: Is it probable that the sum of
contributions to pension funds, plus return on assets, will be
adequate to meet the liabilities that pension funds will be
incurring over the next decade or so? Or is it more likely
that, at a certain time not too far distant, inpayments to the
system will begin to lag behind current contractual obligations
for outpayments from it? The grim possibility that continually
looms in the background is that even though a pension fund's
assets may be growing, the fund itself is becoming more and
y

8more insolvent actuarially, and the reason is that full measure
of its future outgo may take many years to fully develop.
SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION
This thesis v/ill mainly attempt to discuss present
policies, objectives, and practices connected with the admin-
istration and management of corporate pension funds. Quantify-
ing rates of return and investment performance has already been
deemed a very difficult task, if not impossible; however, some
measurements v/ill be presented that are pieced together from
various sources.
This introductory chapter discusses the problems and
some causes of the problems facing pension fund managers. It
establishes the need for more attention to corporate pension
fund administration and management.
Chapter II will briefly describe the history, purpose
and types of pension plans available, and how they are normally
funded.
Chapter III v/ill discuss general policies and objectives
of private pension fund managers, and just what implications
and affects are accrued from employee and labor union relations.
Chapter IV v/ill concentrate on pension fund investment
programs. The general content of pension fund portfolios, how
these portfolios have performed, and the impact of pension costs
of corporate earnings will all be discussed.
William P. Marples, "Actuarial Aspects of Pension
Security," in Gumperz, "Pension Funds," 21-22.

9Chapter V elaborates on the increasing government con-
cern for pension funds, what reforms are proposed, and what
the future holds for the private pension business in the United
States.
Chapter VI contains the summary and author's conclusions
as a result of this study.
RESEARCH METHODS UTILIZED
By far the greatest amount of material for this study
has been drawn from periodicals. Very few current books have
been published on the problems facing pension fund managemont,
which is understandable because of the very contemporary nature
of the problems involved. Libraries used were the Naval Supply
Systems Command, George Washington University, U. S. Department
of Labor, and Fairfax County Public Library. Also utilized was
the Public Documents Section of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Interviews and correspondence with trustees, actuaries,
and pension fund managers were attempted, but, due to the highly
confidential nature of the subject matter (as far as the company




GENERAL BACKGROUND OF PENSION FUNDS
DEFINITIONS
Before going further into the discussion of corporate
pension plans, it is well to describe what a pension fund
actually is, and how it differs from a similar employee in-
centive plan, the "profit sharing" plan. There are many
definitions of pension fund, but one that would be all-encom-
passing is the following:'
A pension -plan is "an orderly, systematic, method by
which an employer can provide for the payment of definitely
determinable benefits to his employees for a definite period
of years, usually for life, after retirement." The company
makes a long-term commitment to fund the program adequately
so that the monies will be available when needed. Some annual
flexibility in timing pension contributions to meet these long
range goals can be worked into the program. A pension fund
is basically a company's pledge to pay certain benefits through
a long period of time in the future.
On the other hand, a deferred "profit-sharing" plan is
basically "an incentive approach to employee security." It is
Bert lietzger, Investment Practices. Performance and
Management of Profit Sharing Trust Funds
,
( Evanston, Illinoi s
,




a plan established by an employer to provide for the direct
and automatic participation by employees in corporate
profits - with payment of benefits at retirement, death,
disability, severance, and possibly during employment.
Deferred profit sharing strives to develop a closer mutuality
of interest between a company and its employees, and it gives
employees a chance to earn added security through their own
extra cooperative, productive efforts.
The following discussions will center around a funded,
benefit type of pension plan, which is the usual arrangement
for corporate plans. Although there are multi-employer plans
and many municipal plans, the corporate plan is the primary
subject of investigation in this paper.
HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF PENSION PLANS
The development of industrial pension plans did not
occur overnight, or even in a matter of a decade. It appears
that the first plan was established in 1875 by the American
Express Company, followed closely by the railroads, which
adopted pensions as a way of retiring trainmen and enginemen
p
who were too old to continue their hazardous jobs. By the
early part of the 20th century, some unions, and state and
local governments began financing their own plans, followed
1Ibid.
pGilbert Burck, "That Ever Expanding Pension Balloon,"
Fortune
, October 1971, 103.
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closely in 1935 by the enactment of the Social Security Act
by Congress. This act was the first step toward providing
nearly all employees with at least some retirement funds,
although it required the employee to contribute sums out of
his wages.
Many factors present in the decade 19 z*-0-1950 greatly
accelerated the growth of pension plans, with World War II
being a definite influence. There was a very strong interest
in attracting and retaining employees during the v/ar, and
when wage and salary controls were imposed, corporations
used wartime profits to finance pension plans in lieu of
granting wage increases. The high tax rates on personal
income and corporate profits added further impetus to the
idea of income deferral in the form of pension benefits.
Then in 194-8, the National Labor Relations Board's
decision in the Inland Steel controversy virtually sealed
the case for pension plans by deciding that retirement
programs were a proper subject for collective bargaining and
enabled labor unions to have a large say in the drafting of
plans. At this point in time, pension plans were recognized
as serving a useful and necessary function in our society,
but there were still only a relatively few workers covered
by the plans. Social security, although already in effect
for some years, provided only a minimal income. This fact,
plus the very existence of the unhappy position of many older
Metzger, Investment Practices, p. 2.
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people, no longer able to earn a living wage, aroused the
conscience of society.
One prime example of the nation's concern for this
problem was the statement of the Steel Industry Board,
appointed by the President in 194-9* which stated:
"Social insurance and pensions should be considered a
part of the normal business costs to take care of temporary
and permanent depreciation in the human "machine" in much the
same way as provision is made for the depreciation and
insurance of plant and machinery. This obligation should be
among the first charges on revenues."
Having been stimulated by both government and society,
there developed in business a growth of a statesmanlike
attitude which, in conjunction with prosperity, stipulated that
pension benefits were both necessary and good for the economy.
Having been deemed good for the economy, it therefore followed
that they were good also for business.
With this support from society, business, and government,
the private pension business expanded phenomenally. As the
chart on page 14 shows, the number of people covered by pri-
vate plans rose from 4,100,000 in 1940 to 31 million in 1970,
and the assets of the funds increased from $2.4 billion to
about ^136 billion. By 1980, if the funds keep growing at




































































































The purpose of private pension plans, as well as all
other pension plans, has already been inferred in the above
discussion. Basically, pension plans provide income to those
who have worked and who retire from choice or necessity. Social
security is providing ever increasing benefits to all eligible
recipients in this country, but with inflation and the cost of
living continually rising, these benefits serve to satisfy only
a little more than the minimum requirements. Private pension
plans supplement these benefits to enable a retired person to
live at a standard of living that is closer to the standard that
he has enjoyed through his productive, working years. Having
these people remain self supporting after wages and salaries
cease to exist for them is extremely important to not only the
individuals themselves, but to the whole nation as well. De-
creased welfare costs are an immediate benefit to the government
and society benefits because retired employees have a certain
degree of financial independence and will remain active pur-
chasers of goods and services instead of becoming dependent
upon the wage earners or the community. The goal of attempting
to keep all citizens, working or unable to v/ork, in a self-
supporting capacity is definitely a highly desirable goal,
extremely healthy for citizens and the country alike.
TYPES OF PENSION PLANS
Pension plans are not restricted to corporations alone;
employees of partnerships and sole proprietorships may also be
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provided for. Additionally, recent legislation introduced by
the President would authorize all working individuals to take
advantage of specified tax benefits by setting up a pension
plan for themselves. This will be elaborated on later.
A qualified pension plan is one that meets the require-
ments of the Internal Revenue Code. All qualified pension
plans are the same in most respects in that they must provide
benefits to employees in general, can include persons who work
outside the United States, have no size restrictions, and are
administered by a pension trust. The trust holds all the
funds and represents the beneficiaries, but carries out the
provisions of the employer's plan.
Although most plans are similar in the above aspects,
there are other slight differences among the plans that are
worthy of description.
Multiple Plan . A multiple plan is a pension system
with separate plans for different groups of employees. One
plan may cover persons on salary; another plan may provide
for workers of a particular union; and yet another plan may
provide for corporate executives. However, all the plans are
2phases of a single system to provide benefits for employees.
Insured or Non-insured Plan . An insured plan is one
in which the benefits are insured, completely or in part, by
Robert S. Holzman, Guide to Pension and Profit
Sharing Plans
,






an insurance company. On the other hand, the plan may be
uninsured, in which case the employer may set up a self-
insured or self-administered plan under which trustees or a
pension committee are designated to manage the plan and its
benefits. The trustee as fiduciary would administer the fund
and handle the investments.
Funded Pension Flan . A funded pension plan is one
providing for the systematic accumulation of the funds re-
quired to take care of the promised pensions. There are many
alternative methods of funding a pension plan, most of which
will be covered later in this chapter.
Annuity Plan . Sometimes the employer may contract with
an insurance company to purchase annuities for his covered
employees. The employees receive certificates outlining their
coverage and benefits. Under this arrangement, the annuity
plan refers to a pension plan under which retirement benefits
are provided under annuity or insurance contracts without a
trust. The annuities may be purchased for each individual
p
employee or for a group of employees.
Money Purchase Plan . These plans specify the employer
contributions for each period of service of each employee, and
the benefit credits are determined as the amounts which such
contributions are sufficient to provide. Any refunds are used












Deposit Administration Flan . This plan is one in which
the benefits are funded by payments to a deposit account held
by an insurer who credits interest and withdraws the amounts
required for the purchase of stipulated annuities for individ-
ual employees. The insurer in this case usually guarantees
against loss of principal from unfavorable investments.
Keogh Plan . Although not specifically a corporate
pension plan, it is well to define this plan. Under this
plan, self-employed persons are allowed to set aside for
themselves and their full time employees 10 per cent of their
earned income up to $2500 annually in a "qualified" pension
pfund of their own choice without paying income taxes on it.
A "qualified" fund in this case refers to any trust, bank,
mutual fund, or other institution that meets government
requirements.
New legislation introduced by President Nixon, hooe-
fully to be approved by the Congress, would allow any indi-
vidual worker, self-employed or not, to set aside $1500 or
20 per cent of his annual wage, whichever is the least,
without having to pay income taxes on it. This plan would
essentially give the opportunity for all the nation's workers
to take advantage of tax benefits by setting aside funds for
their own pension plan. Heretofore, only those who worked




pUnited Business Service, "Pension Plan Tax Equalit:^




able to provide pension benefits for themselves and their
workers. A worker who did not fall into one of these cate-
gories would have only Social Security benefits available
upon retirement.
METHODS OF FUNDING PENSION PLANS
Before a company can decide on the best method of pro-
viding funds for its pension plan, it must determine what the
plan is going to cost. To get into a detailed cost analysis
of pension benefits, using mortality tables, interest schedules,
expected retirement ages in the future, and expected benefit
increases, is beyond the scope of this investigation. Briefly
however, the cost of a pension plan depends basically upon (a)
the employer's tax bracket, (b) the ultimate benefits desired
for the employees, (c) whether or not the plan will qualify
under the Internal Revenue Code so that a full tax deduction
may be taken, (d) whether employees contribute, (e) the extent
to which past service will be recognized, and, (f) how many
years will elapse for accumulation of funds before benefits
are paid. Critical to the cost estimation of any pension plan
is the extent to which investment performance and rates of
return on investment are included. The higher the assumed
rate of return on investments, the less money needed to finance
the fund up to its required level.
Funding is the accumulation of assets for payment of
future benefits. It is imperative that management have some
idea of v/hat its objectives are in order to make sensible and
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logical decisions concerning the funding of its pension
program. In order to do this, the essential ingredient must
be information, and this information must come from different
sources. The sources of information normally available to a
company, and the inputs provided by each source can be broken
down into three categories as follows:
Investment managers provide
1. Return over a specified period from highly
marketable fixed income securities held in the primary
reserve portion of the fund.
2. Cash and non-cash returns for each of the types
of possible investment: common stocks, convertible
bonds, mortgages, leases, real estate developments, etc.
Wage and Salary administrators provide
1. Estimates for each of the next several years
of changes in wage and salary levels, in the number
and pay-grade mix of employees, in the ratio of pension
pay to working pay, plus the possible impact of changes
in pension regulation or in methods of integrating with
Social Security.
Actuaries provide
1. Projections of the impact of shifts in the age
mix of employees, calculations of mortality and dis-
ability effects on benefit payments, and estimates of
the impact of employee turnover.
2. A long term average rate-of-return assumption
based on experience of many comparable managed funds
of a similar size.
Given this information, management is able to predict
the most probable pattern of cost and revenue factors, from
which can be projected the annual level of benefit payments,
the corporation's funding obligation over the next several
years, and the degree of liquidity necessary to ensure the
fund's ability to meet the current and immediate benefit
obligations.
1Ellis, "Danger Ahead," 55-56.
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Although an ever-increasing amount of funds for pension
plans comes from earnings on a fund's investments, employer
contributions continue to represent the largest single source
of income to the funds. Even in contributory plans, in which
the prospective pensioner also contributes, the amount is still
relatively small. In these plans the employees put up only
about Si for every $4- or $5 contributed by the employer.
Looking at all plans, contributory and non-contributory,
employee contributions amount to only about 10 to 15 per cent
2
of the total contributions.
The employer has many options in v/hich to finance his
pension plan, but in order to be able to take full advantage
of tax deductions, he is essentially restricted to the five
acceptable basic cost methods described in the Accounting
Principles Board Opinion No. 8, "Accounting for the Cost of
Pension Plans." These methods can be classified as follows:
1. Individual Level Premium Method
2. Entry Age Normal Method
3. Attained Age Normal Method
4. Aggregate Method ?
5. Unit Credit Method^
A brief description of each method follows. In illustrating
the different methods, interest is assumed to be 3# VeT cent
per annum, the pension is $50 per month, the pensioner was
hired at age 25, is now 45, and will retire at age 65. Assuming
Business Week, The Pressure on Pension Funds to Perform,
(September 11, 1971 ), ST.
2Metzger, Investment Practices
, p, ;+l.
<Paul D. Ealliwell, "Basic Principles of Pension Funding
and APB Opinion No. 3," Management Accounting , July 1969, 15*
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he lives to be eighty years old, the total benefits will amount
to $9000, The pension formula used in this case is 31.25 per
month for each year of service (SI. 25 x 4-0 years = $50 per
month pension).
Individual Level Premium Method . The total amount of
money that is required in order for the pensioner to commence
receiving his $9000 at age 65 is $6380. The difference will
be made up by interest earnings. The employer could decide
to deposit a lump sum of $6380 at the time of retirement, in
which case he would be using Terminal Funding. Alternatively,
the employer could deposit annually into an interest bearing
fund an amount that will accrue to the required sum of 36380
at retirement age. In this case, the annual sum required
would be $217.97, for a 20 year total of $4-359. The differ-
ence between this amount and the required $6380 will be made
up by interest earnings.
Entry Age Normal Method . Instead of the rigid cost
pattern of the previous method, the employer may choose this
more flexible method. The employer determines what annual
payment would have been necessary to accumulate the required
$6380 if he had started contributing when the employee was
first employed at age 25. This figure is $72.90 annually.
However, since he did not do that, he computes what the
present fund balance would be if it had been done, and comes
up with $2,133.27, which includes the 3# per cent interest.
The employer then decides to amortise this past service cost;
however, in computing his past service costs, he is bound by
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minimum and maximum annual amounts set by IRS for tax deduction
purposes. The minimum requires that the employer contribute,
in addition to the normal cost of $72.90, an amount sufficient
to prevent the past service cost from becoming any larger. This
additional cost would be 3)£ per cent of $2133, or $74-. 68, for a
total annual cost of $14-7.58 (72.90 + 74.68). The maximum IRS
limitation permits a deduction equal to the normal cost plus
10 per cent of the past service cost, in which case the employer
could fully amortize the past service cost over a shorter period
of time. Once the past service cost has been amortized, only
the annual normal cost ($72.90) would remain.
Attained Age Level Method . Here the cost of the employee's
benefits assigned to years prior to the inception of the plan is
determined to be $25 ($1.25 x 20 years). The past service cost
of this obligation is then computed (after discounting back 20
years) to be $1603.20. Added to this total past service cost
is the required annual normal costs over the next 20 years of
$108.99 annually in order to bring the retirement fund up to
the required $6380 at age 63 of the employee. This method is
a combination of the Individual Level Premium Method and the
Unit Credit Method, which, is discussed below.
Unit Credit Method . The only difference between this
method and the Attained Age Level Method is the treatment of
the normal costs. Under the Attained Age Level Method, the
normal cost was level, but under the Unit Credit Method, the
normal cost increases each year until retirement age 65 is
reached. As the employee completes each additional year of
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service, he accrues an additional pension of SI. 25 per month.
The employer then determines the present value of each addi-
tional ftl.25 benefit and contributes this amount to the fund.
Obviously this is a more expensive method of financing the
fund because as each year passes there is less and less time
for the interest factor to operate.
Aggregate Method . This method is simply the applica-
tion of the principles for individuals in the Individual
Level Premium Method, applied on a collective basis for all
the company's participants. Usually the cost figure is
expressed as a percentage of total participant payroll.
Of all the methods described above, the Entry Age
Normal Method is perhaps the most widely used. All the
methods have to be flexible to the extent that funding
requirements are not constant from one year to the next. One
company's investment program may provide a return that would
enable it to reduce its contributions significantly. A
classic example is General Electric Corporation, which is
one of the minority of major companies that manages its own
pension investments. Although General Electric 's pension
obligations have almost tripled in the last 10 years, the
cost to the company has hardly changed. GE contributed
$66 million to its pension fund in 1970, as opposed to
$61 million in I960. The increased funding burden has been
o
almost entirely taken up by return on investments.
1Ibid. , 15-19.





On the other hand, some companies have to compensate
for a drop in asset values and investment return by increasing
their pension contributions. Most plans take the cyclical
action of the stock markets into account by allowing sponsors
to average investment results over two or three years, damping
the impact of both short-term declines and advances.
Besides looking to increased investment earnings as a
means of reducing corporate contributions, companies are also
asking for more and heavier contributions from prospective
pensioners. As stated previously, employee contributions
today account for only about 10-15 per cent of the cash flow
into pension funds, but the contributory funds are growing
rapidly. In support of this effort, the Association of
Private Pension and Welfare Plans is urging the government .
to encourage this trend by mailing the employees' pension
contributions tax deductible, as the employers' now are.
Up to this point in the investigation of pension funds,
the discussion has centered around the history, purposes,
types and funding methods of pension plans. Very few problems
have been brought forth and certainly no solutions to the
contemporary issues that are currently being widely discussed.
The next three chapters will attempt to elaborate on these con-
temporary issues and how corporate management is attempting
to keep pace with the changing scene by constantly reviewing





administration of their pension plans, for the benefit of
the firm itself as well as for its employees.

CHAPTER III
ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT OF PENSION FUNDS
GENERAL DISCUSSION
It has already been established that corporate pension
funds are the largest single source of capital in the countr?/
today, almost five times larger than the total of all the
nation's mutual funds put together. Additionally, these
funds are almost certain to grow at an increasing rate as the
pressures for more pension benefits come to bear on the com-
panies. In 1970, company-sponsored plans paid $6 billion in
benefits to 4.2 million pensioners - yet assets set aside
against future demands still increased by $9 billion. So,
even as present benefits continue to increase, the total
assets also increase.
The above figures may be misleading in that current
and previous years results have very little bearing on future
requirements in this constantly changing business. Last
year's figures may be impressive, but what really is important
is what the conditions will be in the next two decades. Using
that time frame as a gauge, the large amounts of pension money
may not be large at all, and may even be too small. So, with





the evidence that expectations and demands of prospective
retirees are growing faster than the funds available to meet
them, pension fund administrators not only have to continually
reevaluate their programs, but must be very sensitive to change.
The following quote, taken from the Report by the Subcommittee
on Employment and Retirement Incomes to the Special Committee
on Aging, United States Senate, June 1965, sums up the nation-
wide concern for after-retirement income:
"America has a long way to go toward adequate
incomes for its elderly, and it needs to take maximum
advantage for every possibility toward this objective.
Our private pension system is a useful tool in pro-
ducing adequate incomes for the later years, and it ..
behooves us to use it imaginatively and unsparingly."
The prevalent feeling among those concerned with pension
planning is that most companies are currently funding their
pensions to provide for no more than the present schedule of
benefits, and that the corporations were contributing far too
little to their funds when corporate earnings were high and
they could have afforded it. The point is that when profit
margins are lower, funding requirements will almost certainly
increase and the company will find it harder to bear the bur-
den then. The present planning then, has oversights in that
it understates the size of the pension liability being incurred
2
now and it forces the companies to "play catch up ball" later.
The asset manager of a pension fund has a definite
obligation to attempt to widen the possibilities of expanding
1Metzger, Investment Performance
, p. 1.
2Ellis, "Danger Ahead," 53.
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pension payments to the employees covered by a fund and those
expected to be covered by it, while minimizing the burden that
might be imposed on the shareholders of the firm (in the form
of reduced earnings per share). This obligation however, is
subordinate to the objective of meeting the established yield
requirement set forth by the actuary. Accomplishing all these
goals is admittedly difficult, but the funds have altered the
previously prevailing practice of conservative investments,
which not only missed opportunities to hedge their funds
against inflation, but they also incurred higher costs than
necessary. This alteration of policy has been in the form of
increased growth of common stocks as an investment medium.
A pension fund and its investment program is obviously
a long term proposition, and in planning the administration
and management of the fund, the manager must analyze long term
fund needs and resources, and just who in particular is going
to manage these funds. In previous years the pension plans
were handled almost exclusively within the corporate structure
itself, but the more recent trend has been to give the invest-
ment responsibility to outside managers. The use of outside
managers can be in the form of using .just one manager, or the
funds can be split up between two or more managers. In this
way, the company can give more or less money to each fund
manager depending on what his performance is, or it can drop
him altogether if his performance is consistently below
standard. The majority of pension assets are managed by
20.
Groot, "Declining Asset Values in Pension Funds,"
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banks, but mutual funds, insurance companies, and more
recently, even brokerage houses have entered the field of
pension fund management. This is not to say that the companies
have turned over investment responsibility to outside managers
entirely, A common practice among corporations is to have the
outside trustee plus a corporate advisory board handle the
administration and investment of their funds, with responsi-
bility over selection of individual fund holdings almost evenly
divided between the trustees and parties within the company.
The managers of these funds, whether inside the company
or external to the firm, must be guided by the consideration
that while, for most pension funds, assets and increments to
them in the form of contributions and yield are more than ade-
quate to meet short term obligations (up to five years), they
are much less than will be required to satisfy obligations
that will arise in the future: ten, twenty or thirty years
later. It therefore follows that the time horizon of a pension
fund's asset manager should not be the next quarter or the next
year, but ten, twenty, and thirty years ahead, and that asset
management must be predicted on a ten-year, twenty-year, and
^thirty-year basis (the last being the period to maturity of
p
most corporate bonds).
Different pension funds will have different claims that
must be honored over different Deriods of time. The incidence
Metzger, Investment Performance
, p. 170.
Julian Gumperz, and Everett W. Page, Jr., "Misconcep-




of these claims will have an impact on the types of invest-
ments that will be possible and when they are possible. There
are certain constraints that a pension fund manager must con-
tend with when making investment decisions, depending on the
particular fund involved. Some of these constraints are:
Market ability . This consideration is very important
when the benefits provided by a pension fund are fixed and
enforceable by law or union contract, and when the current
and immediately prospective claims upon a fund are large
relative to annual contributions. In this situation, the
marketability of the fund assets and the degree of ability
to convert them to cash and other assets is a very limiting
constraint on investment policy.
Risk . This constraint applies to both market risk and
business risk. If a fund's resources are small relative to
prospective demands upon it, high-risk investments must be
avoided. However, most funds are large relative to current
demands, so the volatility and short term variability of mar-
ket prices is not of significance. The element of business
risk, which is the matter of how the company, and not its
securities, fares over time, is much more important. It con-
cerns the company's ability to cover interest payments,
amortization charges, principal on maturity; in other words,
its ability to survive.
Timing of Yield . There is a tendency for corporate
management to encourage asset managers to strive for as high
a yield as possible, thinking that this would enable them to
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reduce their annual contributions necessary to maintain
adequate funding. The problem with this policy is that any
sustained rise in yield will raise expectations of employees
for increased benefits. If these liberalized benefits are
realized through union negotiations, management, by pressing
for the higher yields, is, in effect, deferring pension costs
into the future and must eventually increase its annual con-
tribution. This can be very detrimental when negative earn-
ings or negative yield coincides with rising liabilities.
The Studebaker Corporation case is a classic example of this
occurrence where declining earnings, and then severe deficits,
came up against rigid pension fund liabilities, causing its
pension fund to become deplete and thus deprive many of its
employees of their deserved pensions.
With all the above constraints, considerations, and
alternatives, the problems of pension fund administrators loom
even larger. There evidently is no one absolute direction for
these managers to take, but there certainly must be one that
is most right for the company concerned. The main element
that is necessary is that management should not be forced to
decide either yes or no on any one particular investment pro-
gram. There should be a variety of relevant alternatives avail-
able from which can be selected an optimum program of funding
and investing assets. The right direction must be primarily
determined by the nature and requirements of the fund that is





merit set up by outside observers. Once the investment and
funding decisions are made, investment management must keep
tuned with changes, and should require regular reviews of
the program, with a view toward investment results that would
make it possible to either decrease the required contributions
from employers or to increase benefits to employees, or some
combination of both. In his attempt to enhance the economic
value of the assets of a fund, the manager must invest these
assets in situations with respect to what is happening funda-
mentally in technology, markets, government, and deeper still,
with respect to changes in knowledge, taste, and temper of our
times, and that the probabilities are maximized that the value
of the assets v/ill be preserved.
INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES
Objectives
Every trust fund's objective is obviously the maximiza-
tion of the value of the fund. It is apparent however, that
this objective is really composed of two lesser objectives -
safety of principal and maximum potential for gain, which,
p
unfortunately, are contradictory to each other. It is imper-
ative then, that the corporation take definite and positive






Netzger, Investment Performance, p. 218.

34
The first step in a firm's determination of investment
objectives for its pension program is an examination of the
benefit and contribution schedules. The results obtained
from this examination will determine what the fund's goals are.
The goals can take the form of (1) maximum long-term return on
investment v/ithout undue risk, (2) maximum growth, (3) maximum
current income, or (4-) any combination of the first three.
Long term objectives are the determining factors in any
decision made by fund managers, but these long term objectives
can possibly be achieved by short-term decisons and trade-offs.
An asset manager may decide to accept the chance of short- jerm
deterioration of value in some of the fund's assets if there
is a relativly high probability of recovery of value for most
such assets, and of a rise of value for the totality of fund
assets over the longer term. In this regard, separation of
investment objectives may become important. A corporation may
decide to call on more than one outside advisor to handle the
pension funds, each with different sums of money to invest and
each armed with different objectives. Regardless of any possi-
ble combination of objectives, or single objective if that is
the case, the achievement of the maximum total earnings for
each dollar of contributions over the longest possible term,
consistent with safety requirements, is the definite over-
riding goal of any pension plan.
Bennett S. Kopp, "Managing Pension Portfolios to Meet
Increasing Future Costs," Commercial and Financial Chronicle ,
August 13, 1970, 18.
p




Before a firm can decide on what its pension fund
management policies and objectives are going to be, it has to
first decide who is going to set the policies, what authority
this individual or group will have, and where this aspect of
the firm's operations will fit into the overall corporate
structure. In order to meet the challenge of pension fund
operations, the trustee must be organized; organized in the
sense that the attitude and flexibility of the investment
committee, the setting of realistic and attainable goals, and
the stimulation of the investment personnel are all such as to
enhance the achievement of the fund's objectives. The attitude
of the policy-maliing committee has much influence on the over-
all operation of the fund, it can either be of immeasurable
assistance in producing satisfactory results or, because of
lack of interest and initiative, it can be a deterrent to the
achievement of specified goals.
The investment of funds by any individual, group, cor-
poration, or trustee involves a constant review and update of
investment policies. The challenge and opportunities that
continually present themselves in the changing money markets
are reason enough for managers to constantly review their
procedures. In the pension fund field in particular, the
most significant trends in pension investment policies have
been the following:
Charles A. Pingree, "Organizing for Investment
Performance," Pension and Welfare News , May 1969, 33.
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1. broader diversification of holdings
2. more aggressive investment posture
3. increasing investment sophistication among fund
managers
4-. more widespread retention of outside investment
advisors
5. intensified seeking out of investment opportunities
that would improve investment performance
6. greater sensitivity to market conditions when
making investment decisions.
The reasons for this drastic change from conservative
to aggressive policies has already been discussed. Even within
the new policy structure itself, there is even more cause to
constantly review the investment program. Obviously, the
prospect of a bear market, a bull market, or a static market,
all have different implications, and the effects of these
implications must be contended with.
A very important aspect is just how the company looks
upon the management of its pension fund and how it fits into
the corporate structure. Good long-term investment results,
whether they be capital investments or pension fund investments,
can make a significant difference in corporate earnings by its
effect on earnings per share. It has already been established
that a pension fund is a very definite long term investment
for most companies, and therefore does not have to rely on
short-term results or on current income to meet benefit obli-
gations. With this in mind, a corporation's top management





for the pension fund as it does in the operating divisions,
and should accept comparable interim risks to achieve com-
parable long-term profit rewards. In other words, the com-
panies should, and evidence shov/s that they do, look at its
pension fund as a competitive user of capital to be rigorously
compared with the other operating divisions that also use the
firm's capital.
In selecting the investment advisor, or advisors, the
corporation must not only consider who should be the best choice,
but also how many advisors should be used. The trend is toward
the use of more than one advisor, but some firms are still
reluctant to use any outside advisor at all, preferring to
make their own investment decisions. Even in these companies,
the decisions are not made by any one individual, but rather
by a committee, consisting of three or four individuals who
discuss and decide what investments should be made and what
areas should be concentrated on.
As stated, most firms are utilizing outside advisors.
Before selecting any advisors, the firm must first decide what
its objectives are and what group of outside advisors are best
qualified to handle the firm's portfolio. In choosing the
advisors, past performance should be the main criteria. The
number of advisors chosen will of course depend on the size of
the fund involved, but generally speaking, if the company
selects more than a limited number of firms, the results would
probably be closer to that of the universe of all stocks. On
^-Ellis, "Danger Ahead," 53.
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the other hand, selection of one manager might be too great a
risk if that advisor were to make a major mistake in its phil-
osophy about the economy or the market.
If the trustees, as the investment managers, are to be
tasked with providing the greatest possible total rate of re-
turn, and are being held responsible for that task, it is
imperative that they be given complete authority to buy, sell,
or retain those securities they feel to be best suited for the
accomplishment of the objectives. For a corporation which is
accustomed to handling its own pension fund investments, this
delegation of authority may be very difficult to accept, but
it is evident that more and more companies are doing just that
in their quest for the best investment advice they can obtain
for their programs.
Conversely, if the corporations are going to entrust
their funds to these professional investment counselors, it is
the duty of these outside advisors to do their best to prudently
balance a basic policy of preserving the value and purchasing
power of the company's principal, while at the same time main-
taining an aggressive philosophy aimed at securing growth of
capital and increased income when this can be accomplished
2
without undue risk.
William A. W. Stewart, III, "Splintering Pension Funds
For Outside Management," Pension and Welfare News , December,
1970, 60.
p
John D. Bagnall, "Alternatives in Investment Manage-
ment," Pension and Welfare News , December, 1970, 36.
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Federal tax laws have a large amount of influence and
impact on just how policies and obligations are set by fund
managers, and carried out by investment advisors. The funds
are allowed favored tax treatment, but must meet strict cri-
teria concerning the handling and accounting for assets before
qualifying for this favored treatment. With regard to tax
laws, the investment advisors are given some flexibility in
stock trades in that the pension fund account is not like an
individual account, and there's no reason for not selling
stocks that have advanced over a short time period since
short term gains or losses are not factors to be considered.
One highly important factor in the making of investment
policy that has been mentioned briefly previously is the sub-
ject of liquidity. The investment trustee must know what the
need for liquidity is and how much liquidity is necessary for
a particular pension fund. The corporation must have an almost
infallible understanding and knowledge of what its current cash
needs are and it must impart this information to the trustee..
Many corporations are invested entirely in highly liquid invest-
ments, and unnecessarily so. These are not always the highest
rate of return investments. The wrong balance of liquidity
in its investments can cost a firm money. If the investments
are too liquid, a lower return is probably the result. On the
other hand, if a firm's portfolio does not have the liquid
investments necessary to meet current needs, it will lose
Forbes, As I See It , November 15, 1971, 72.
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money by having to convert these investments to cash at what
might be an inopportune time,
A word is necessary at this point to discuss briefly
the possible limitations that are connected with the recent
policy change to more aggressive investment postures. The
effort to substantially increase returns on investments takes
on two facets: current yield, in the form of interest, divi-
dends, rents, royalties and other earnings on assets; and,
capital gains on sale of assets.
The current yield aspect has two limitations. Recent
high rates of interest have presented a great opportunity for
higher yields, hov/ever, only recent and current income could
have been invested at these high rates, previous income being
locked into debt instruments that yield much lower rates of
return. Additionally, the improbability, and the undesir-
ability, that these high rates will persist means that the
large pension funds cannot count on achieving and maintaining
these high yields. Returns on large and diversified stores
of securities cannot, on the average and in the long run,
exceed the rates of return on capital characteristic of an
2
economy at each stage of its development.
The search for capital gains resulted from this
appreciation of the limited potential of yield. Unfortunately,
although many paper gains are made, when the attempt is made to
realize these gains by selling, the prices of the issues would





most likely drop significantly. It is entirely possible that
"performance" oriented investors, including the investment
managers of pension funds, by their aggressive practices, can
bid up the price of issues beyond all reason, only to have the
opposite effect take place v/hen an attempt is made to sell the
issues.
The apparent high yield available and apparent capital
gains made can mislead a corporation into thinking that assets
have increased, thereby allowing a reduction of contributions.
This can have very detrimental long term consequences.
EMPLOYEE, MANAGEMENT , LABOR UNION CONSIDERATIONS
Having looked at the general administration, management,
and policy making aspects of corporate pension funds, it is
well now to devote some attention to the internal and external
influences that affect the administrative and policy decisions
that are made. At the present time the U. S. government has
not gotten deeply involved in the regulation and control of
corporate non-insured pension funds; however, it has provided
for the registration, reporting, and disclosure of employee
welfare and pension benefit plans in the form of "The Welfare
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, As Amended."
Having recognized that pension plans affected, (1) the
well-being and security of millions of employees, (2) the
stability of employment, (3) the national public interest, and




acted to provide for the general welfare and the free flow of
commerce by certain disclosures made by corporations with re-
spect to the operation and administration of such plans. The
essence of this Act is to require that the administrator of an
employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit
plan shall publish to each participant or beneficiary covered
thereunder (1) a description of the plan and, (2) an annual
financial report. The description shall include a complete
schedule of benefits, the names and addresses of trustees, the
source of financing, etc. The annual report shall include the
amount contributed by the employer and a statement of assets
2
specifying the total amount in cash, bonds, stocks, loans, etc.
—
-5!he single most important group of assets that any organ-
ization has are the employees that work for it. Without the
sincere and conscientious efforts of its employees, an organi-
zation is doubtful of success and maybe even survival. In any
economic climate, the young company, in particular, which hopes
to grow and prosper wants to attract, train, and retain new
employees as well as to hold on to more experienced workers.
An attractive profit sharing or retirement pension plan can
be a powerful force in this regard. One of the most important
concerns for an individual is for the future security of him-
self and his dependents, and the better, more secure a pension
plan is, the more apt a company will be able to attract and
The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, As




, sec. 6, sec. 7»
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retain these necessary individuals. A study made by the
Monthly Labor Review reported that turnover rates were not-
ably lower - for both younger and older workers - in firms
that had private pension plans than in those that did not.
Corporations cannot overlook this implication of a good pen-
sion plan.
How much pension should or would be the desirable level
for an employee after retirement? The variability of the ans-
wers to this question is wide but there is almost universal
agreement that a pension arrangement ought to enable a retired
employee to maintain a level of living consistent with his
contribution to the productive process. According to most
experts, this would mean a pension equivalent to anywhere from
50 to 100 per cent of the final or maximum pay received by the
pensioner before retirement. The expansionists in social secur-
ity argue for a level close to final take-home pay, adjusted to
inflation. This compares with the average pension of the re-
tired American today of 25 per cent of his terminal or maximum
p
salary or wage. To raise the pension benefits to higher levels
would be an extremely expensive sacrifice in the form of higher
corporate contributions, plus almost certain greater payroll
deductions, resulting in a decline of spendable income for the
employee.
There is generally no argument against the United States
being able to afford higher pension standards for its citizens.
Paul P. Harbrecht, S. J., " Pension Funds and Economic
Power
,
(New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1959), p. 35-
p
Burck, "The Ever Expanding Pension Balloon," 100.
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The imbalance between the incomes of working and pensioned
Americans must be adjusted and compensated for at a rate that
workers, and particularly, labor unions, will stand for. More
important, the higher standards will have to come gradually.
The labor unions are blamed for reducing the nation's ability
to pay more generous pensions because of the stands they have
taken in recent labor negotiations. In some cities and in-
dustries, policemen, garbage men, steel, and auto workers have
already won contracts that allow them to retire at half pay
after twenty years, and are asking for full pay after forty
years. The reduction in retirement age from 65 to 60, and to
even 55 as some desire, cannot possibly be offset by any fore-
seeable productivity gains. Add to this the possible loss of
productivity if the trend toward the 4 day-40 hour week continues,
Nevertheless, the major labor unions are pushing ever
further in their demands for increased pension benefits. Pen-
sion plans are a built-in fact of corporate life and their
terms and benefits are almost always an integral part of any
labor-management bargaining when contract renewals come up.
Also, the use of a profit-sharing plan, whose costs are more
related to company profits, in lieu of a pension plan is
frowned upon by labor leaders. Today's labor leaders gener-
ally distrust the employer's computation of profits, and
furthermore, the whole idea of profit-sharing is repugnant to
some labor leaders who try to discourage the mutuality of




more desirable by the unions because the benefits can be
definitely defined in every economic climate, regardless of
the profit picture.
Of the government, employee, and labor implications
discussed above, the corporation is probably more restricted
and influenced by labor union demands than the others. How-
ever, there are signs of increasing concern on the part of
the government, which will be elaborated on in Chapter V.
Regardless of where or from whom the pressures come from,
management has to consider all of them in its process of
selecting between various possible policies and objectives
in the administration of its particular pension fund.
60.






Just as different cost and contribution figures and
patterns have much influence on the basic investment policies
and objectives of a pension fund, so also do they influence
the investment strategy and composition of the investment
portfolio of the fund. And because these cost and contribu-
tion figures are constantly changing, the structure of almost
all pension fund portfolios has also changed over the past
ten to twenty years.
At the beginning of the Fifties, trustees managing
non-insured corporate pension funds had about one third of
their assets in United States government securities, 45 per
cent in corporate bonds, and only about 12 per cent in common
stocks. By I960, less than 5 Ver cent was invested in govern-
ment securities, about 40 per cent in corporate bonds, while
the share allotted to common stocks had risen to over 40 per
cent. Five years later in 1965, the relative figures had
changed again, with common stock getting still a greater







PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CORPORATE FUNDS BY HOLDINGS
1951 - 1965
Holding 1951 I960 1965
Cash and Deposits 4.1 1.3 1.1
U. S. Government Securities 51.4 6.2 3.6
Corporate Bonds 44.7 40.2 30.0
Preferred Stock 4.0 1.9 1.2






Source: Securities and Exchange Commission annual reports
on "Noninsured Corporate Pension Funds."
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of the assets of non-insured Corporate Pension Funds by
holdings during these time periods.
j As can be seen from the table, every holding decreased
percentage—wise except for mortgages and common stock. Mort-
gages (FHA, VA, conventional residential, and income and
industrial real estate) have become increasingly attractive
to pension fund managers. But the big story revolves around
common stock. The figures shown really do not show the entire
picture in that much of the funds controlled by these institu-
tions are locked into long term securities, and cannot readily
be converted to common stock. However, new funds coming into
the plans are being invested in common stocks at even higher
percentages. As late as 1969, emphasis on common stock
reached a peak when 85 per cent of the inflow of new capital
was invested in stocks, and the total of common stock holdings
2
was about 65 per cent of all pension fund holdings.
The reasons for this trend toward increased holdings
in common stock have been discussed previously but bear
repeating again. The primary reason is probably the dili-
gent quest of fund managers for capital appreciation and
future earnings growth, but almost equally important are the
higher yields available on high grade equities over fixed in-
come alternatives and the "hedge against inflation" argument.
Bert L. Metzger, "Investment Management of Pension and
Profit Sharing Trust Funds," Pension and Welfare News , August,
1969, 44.
p
Gordon L. Bowyer, "1970, Year of Opportunity for Pension
Fund Investment," Financial Executive , September, 1970, 47.
^Metzger, Investment Performance , p. 41.
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General Electric, mentioned previously as one company that
manages its own pension investments, has drastically moved
away from bonds toward common stocks, which now makes up 65
per cent of its portfolio. It has also put money in oil wells,
mortgages, venture capital deals, and even post offices, bought
and leased back to the Postal Service. In 1970, the cash flow
from these investments alone covered the entire $33 million
that was due the pensioners, proving the success of the more
aggressive and less conservative investment policies of the
company.
Devoting some attention to the equity holdings them-
selves, the fund managers are more notable for the large number
of individual investment choices than for any concentration in
a few companies. For example, in a recent survey, there were
only four companies whose stock was held by 30 or more of the
49 funds surveyed, and only 44- stocks were held by as many as
ten of the funds. On the other hand, 260 stocks were held by
only one fund each, and another 109 stocks by two funds. The
front runners, both in the number of funds holding and in
aggregate market value, are the classic favorites of all
institutional investors; IBM, General Motors, Texaco, Xerox,
General Electric, Eastman Kodak, Standard of New Jersey, ATT,
Gulf Oil, Sears, and Minnesota Mining. But, not unlike other
institutions, such as mutual funds, the trend toward perform-
ance is also evident in such popular holdings as Litton





Industries, National Cash Register, Occidental Petroleum,
Magnavox, Texas Instruments, Sperry Rand, and other more
volatile stocks.
Another influencing factor that has resulted from
this change of pension fund investment philosophy is the
effect on the markets. Because the funds are investing a
higher percentage of net receipts in common stock and
because of the accelerating activity within their portfolios,
the trading of large blocks of stock by one or more funds at
the same time will produce greater price swings than would
normally be the case. Unlike performance-oriented mutual
funds, most pension funds still have a strong tendency to
"buy and hold," but there is much more trading proportionally
2in these funds than there was 10 to 20 years ago. The fact
that ever increasing amounts of new funds are being used to
purchase common stocks involves a built-in increase of trading
activity, but figures reveal also a marked relative increase
in sales transactions. Table 3 shows the common stock trans-
actions of pension plans from 1953 to 1965. As can be seen,
the ratio of purchases to sales has decreased markedly, and
although later figures than those for 1965 are not presented,
it can be expected that the ratio will continue to decrease
Pension and Welfare News, Surveys of Pooled Pension
Fund Holdings
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COMMON STOCK TRANSACTIONS OF TRUSTEES PENSION PLANS
Year Purchases Sales




1955 515 74 23.8 6.9
1954 738 148 31.3 5.0
1955 858 249 28.7 3.4
1956 1000 229 32.3 4.4
1957 1186 208 36.5 5.7
1958 1527 535 43.0 4.6
1959 2207 544 50.9 4.1
I960 2441 625 51.2 3.9
1961 3440 1170 62.4 2.9
1962 3205 995 58.3 5.2
1963 5760 1555 55.8 2.4
1964 ^575 2105 51.2 2.1
1965 5585 2560 59.8 2.2




as pension fund managers step up trading activity in the
desire for improved investment performance.
INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE
A keen and increasing interest in the subject of
pension fund investment performance has developed among
corporate financial officers having responsibility for the
administration of pension funds and among the trustees with
whom these funds have been entrusted. The primary force in
this interest is a result of the urgency of controlling the
cost of retirement benefits, but the increasing awareness
also results from rising living costs, which force negotiated
benefits higher, and shrinking profit margins. This recent
trend toward performance is causing these administrators to
realize that even a small increase in such performance can
well offset the effect of future benefit increases as well
as reduce present contributions to the pension plans.
The need for good measurements of investment perform-
ance is self-evident. Being the fastest growing pool of
financial assets in the United States, the magnitude and
importance of pension funds impose responsibilities not only
upon private corporations, actuaries, accountants, investment
counselors, and trustees, but also the federal government.
It is of utmost importance to the expected recipients of
these funds that these assets be managed efficiently and
safely if their expectations of future financial independence
are to be realized. It is equally important to all Americans
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that these economic resources be effectively managed, and if
asset management is to be effective, it is necessary to have
a sound basis for investment evaluation.
Pension funds have been under some scrutiny in recent
years because of the overall performance of their investments.
It is generally agreed that pension fund assets should earn
dividends and appreciation at least equal to the market as a
whole. Yet, when measured against some of the leading market
indicators, such as the Standard and Poor 500 Stock Index, the
rate of return on the equity portion of many pension funds
ppersistently lags behind. It must be made perfectly clear
at this point however, that investment performance of a pension
fund is important only inasmuch as it demonstrates the meeting
or surpassing of a specified goal or goals. It should not be
used in any other context.
There are obviously many schools of thought concerning
what should be the criteria of measuring investment perform-
ance. Among the many points of view, and considerations are:
1. overall, or total, rate of return
2. volatility of rate of return
3. selection of securities in the fixed and variable
portions of the entire portfolio
z!-. timing of investments between fixed and variable
return securities.
In order for a performance index to be accurate, it
must combine current yield on the securities owned with the
Peter 0. Dietz, "Evaluating the Performance of Pension
and Profit Sharing Trusts," in Metzger, Investment Performance ,
P. 550.
Croot, "Coping With Declining Asset Values," 27.
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increase or decrease in the market value of those securities
over the period being studies, it must adjust for company and
employee (if any) contributions, and, to be of value in com-
parison, the measurement must be over a period of time,
including several business cycles. Additionally, a fund's
performance should be judged also by the values that are real-
izable in the marketplace, and the degree of confidence that
present values can indeed be expected to be realized if an
augmentation of funds is needed. Book value of assets should
be irrelevant, and there should be no distinction between
income and principal, nor between realized or unrealized
capital gains. What really is important is the amount of
dollars that a fund can come up with if all the assets were
sold. 2
The concept of total rate of return has evolved almost
universally as the standard measure of evaluating the perform-
ance of various portfolios. Of course there are variations of
computing total return, but as long as the same criteria is
used when comparing different investment vehicles, the end
result should be the same. Perhaps the most widely known
definition of total return is that supplied and used by the
Profit Sharing Research Foundation (PSRF), one of the foremost
groups involved in the evaluation of corporate pension and
profit sharing plans. PSRF defines total return as follows:
1 John M. Tuttle, "The Use of Investment Counsel by
Profit Sharing Trusts," in Iletzger, Investment Performance ,
p. 514.
pGumperz and Page, "Misconceptions," 7^.
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"Income from dividends, interest, and rent," divided
by the average of total market value (MV) of fund equity at
beginning and end of year less one half of investment income,
plus "gains (losses) realized and unrealized," divided by the
same base. In equation form, total return equals:
Income + Gains (Losses)







J - % (Income)
This can admittedly become somewhat complicated, yet
is probably the most accurate determination of total return.
There are still other more sophisticated methods and some less
sophisticated, but it is not the purpose of this paper to delve
too deeply into the methods of measurement of rate of return.
It is important to note however, that measurement of the rate
of return should not be the only measurement criteria. Returns
from investments must be compared against risk. Once the element
of risk has been determined, perhaps even quantified, either
over-emphasis on return or ultra-conservative investments will
become apparent, and can hopefully be corrected.
The task of accurately pinpointing the investment per-
formance of a specific pension fund over a specific period of
time is an almost impossible one. Securities and Exchange
Commission regulations do not require that the companies
reveal performance figures, and most choose not to do so for
various reasons. Various publications and organizations have
Bert L. Metzger, "Investment Management of Pension and




their own methods of evaluating the performance of these funds,
some using total return, some including capital gains realized
only, and some using income return only. Comparisons are
usually made with the popular indices and with other pension
funds rather than with mutual funds because mutual funds have
entirely different objectives, even within the mutual fund
category itself, and most mutual funds certainly are not
investing for long term results.
One figure that has been suggested as a satisfactory
objective for pension fund performance is a 12 per cent com-
pound rate of return over a five year time span. This figure
may seem arbitrary, but it relates to certain historical data
in the following ways:
1. It is more than twice the average yield of 5-63
per cent obtained on Moody's triple B utility bonds for the
five year period ending December, 1968.
2. It is double the generally accepted estimate of a
sustainable growth rate for the national economy.
3. It compares with an actual figure of 7-7 per cent
for the Dow Jones Industrial Average for the five year period
ending December, 1968, and would be sufficient to produce
additional incentive trustee compensation under many of the
present formulae for those who are thinking along these lines,
and,
LV. The return on net worth for manufacturing concerns
from 1963 to 1967 ranged from 10.3 per cent to 13.4- per cent,
to average exactly 12 per cent.
Pingree, "Organizing for Investment Performance," 39-
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Looking first at the rate of return on income alone,
Table 4 shows the income return of corporate pension funds
and how it compares with the average yield that was available
through Savings and Loan Associations and Mutual Savings Banks.
It is obvious that the return of the pension funds was con-
sistently less than that available through Savings and Loan
Associations, but varied somewhat in comparison to return on
Mutual Savings Bank accounts.
Table 5 shows the recent results of particular pension
funds within particular industries, plus 26 large, balanced
mutual funds. All the pension funds in this comparison are
self-administered and do not utilize the services of any
outside investment advisors. The gross return indicated is
computed by the total of investment receipts and capital
gains (losses) realized divided by total assets. The result
does not include capital gains (losses) of assets still held
by the funds. The fact that the banking industry is able to
attain higher performance with their own funds is not surpris-
ing since bank trustees generally have much more investment
experience and they themselves are used quite extensively by
those funds that do employ outside advisors. A valid assump-
tion can therefore be made at this point that, generally
speaking, those companies that utilize investment counsel
would normally show better pension fund investment performance
than those firms that administer their own investment programs.
Table 6 shows the average annual rate of return on




COMPARISON OP NONINSURED CORPORATE PENSION FUND
INCOME RETURN WITH SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION










1956 3.96^ 5.15% 3.65%
1957 5.83 5.25 3.80
1958 4.30 5.34 3.92
1959 4.45 5.46 4.08
I960 4.35 5.61 4.25
1961 4.80 5.71 4.41
1962 4.36 5.87 4.56
1963 4.49 5.85 4.68
1964 4.93 5.93 4.79
1965 5.22 5.91 4.89
1966 4.99 5.97 5.02
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal


















Banking 25 1,159 4.81 1967
Textile 25 500 4.54 1968
Communications 25 6,270 3.99 1967
Aerospace 22 1,000 3.90 1968
Petroleum 25 2,4-30 3.91 1968
Utilities 25 1,000 3.80 1969
Retailing 25 3,850 3.72 1969
Insurance 25 210 3.66 1969
Plastics/
Rubber 25 708 3.63 1968
Transportation 25 1,250 3.55 1969
Publishing 25 250 3.40 1968
Mutual Funds 26 9,000 3.30 1968




AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF RETURN ON INVESTMENTS
OF NON-INSURED CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS
BY SOURCE AND BY PERIOD
Source of





3.58 3.64 5.^7 3.48 3.55 3.52
Capital
Gains
2.52 2.27 10.64 -6.11 7.52 0.43
Total c. on 5.91 14.11 -2.63 10.35 4.00
Source: Profit Sharing Research Foundation.-
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and by period. The total return is broken down into investment
income and capital gains, both realized and unrealized. The
results shown are the averages for both self-administered
funds and funds which utilize outside advisors. It is apparent
from the results shown that up to 1961, the capital gains income
for the funds was only nominal, indicating very little trading
activity in the markets. From 1961 on, the funds obviously
took a more aggressive attitude toward common stock investments
as evidenced by the greater volatility of the capital gains and
losses. The investment income from dividends, interest, etc.,
remained steady throughout the periods shown.
Table 7 shows a comparison of the results of Table 6
with the annual change of the New York Stock Exchange Index,
thought to perhaps be the best indicator of stock market actions
since it averages all the stocks listed on the New York Stock
Exchange. These results show that in 1961, when the funds
became more active in the markets, the rates of return of the
pension funds started to make wider swings, but still not as
wide as the NYSE Index, indicating that although the funds did
become more active, they were still basically more conservative
in their selection of investments. Eliminating the years 1959
and I960 because of the nominal stock holdings of the funds,
a comparison of the average return between 1961 and 1966
shows that the pension funds averaged an annual return of
5.72 per cent, whereas the NYSE Index increased an average of




COMPARISON OF PENSION FUND TOTAL RATE OF RETURN AND
PERCENT ANNUAL CHANGE OF NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE INDEX
Pension Fund Total NYSE Annual




1962 - 2.63 -13.1
1963 10.85 15.3
1964-•1966 4.0 4.1
Source: Profit Sharing Research Foundation.
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The data presented suggest that there is considerable
room for improvement in the investment management of most
trusts. Certainly the New York Stock Exchange Index of all
listed stocks can be improved upon by capable management, and
there is no reason why the pension fund returns should not
only at least equal the long term performance of the Index,
but even surpass it by many percentage points. The quest for
superior performance, which is being witnessed today, insofar
as it is based on sound values and solid earnings growth, is
both justified and overdue. Such are examples of criticisms
currently being directed at pension fund management.
Are these criticisms justified? Performance measure-
ments are meaningful, and should command the attention of
corporate management, but only insofar as it relates to the
requirements and objectives of particular funds. It is evident
that performance comparisons must take account of rate of growth
of the fund, timing of cash flows, and if possible, the level of
2
risk incurred in achieving a given rate of return. This is not
to say that portfolio managers should purposely set low objec-
tives so that they can more easily be achieved. Corporate
management should be vitally concerned with the dollars and
cents implications of investment performance. It is generally
understood and agreed that a difference of one per cent in










cent reduction in contributions over a period of time,
assuming the age distribution of the employees is normal,
and no unusual actuarial assumptions are necessary. The
real test of superior portfolio management is whether or not
management meets objectives, and one of the prime objectives
should be to reduce pension costs to the company, with due
regard to risk and safety,
IMPACT Off PENSION COSTS ON CORPORATE EARNINGS
The above discussions have centered on the portfolios
and performance of pension fund investment programs, and how
these two aspects are affected by internal and external
influences. Conversely, it is well to consider at this
point just what influence they have on the corporation's
financial operations.
A recent article in Forbes Magazine appraised the
pension situation from the standpoint of the investor v/ith
the caption "Warning: These People Can Be Dangerous," which
appeared under a photograph of retirees in rocking chairs.
The article went on to say that the day may come when U. S.
business is paying as much to pensioners as to stockholders,
and pension obligations "may force some major U. S. corporations
to the wall." 2
Kopp, Managing Pension Portfolios
, p. 18, and Metsger,
Investment Performance
, p . 544- •
p
Employee Benefit Plan Review, Forbes Looks at Pensions ,
November, 1970, p. 81.
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The implications of the above statement are obvious.
Pension contributions can come from only two sources, outside
investments and internal operations. What outside investments
do not provide in offsetting pension costs must be provided by
cash flows within the corporation. These contributions, coming
from corporate earnings can have only one effect on profits and
earnings per share, they can only decrease them. Thus the need
for superior investment performance by pension fund trustees.
A pension fund, as previously mentioned, can be an
important profit center for a corporation as above average
investment results have a direct bearing on profits through
keeping costs down. In fact, the results of the pension fund
investment program can be more important than the profit results
of large divisions in some companies. When the subject of
profits is discussed, the responsibility of corporate manage-
ment shifts from its employees to its shareholders. The
objective of a company, as far as its owners are concerned,
is the maximization of profits and value of the company in the
market place. Common stock valuation is perhaps effected most
by earnings per share of the company's stock, and these earn-
ings are greatly influenced by pension costs.
Even though a company's contributions to its pension
fund are tax deductible, they can have an especially serious
effect on earnings during lean years, when corporate profits
are already down and stock market conditions are normally
Bagnall, "Alternatives in Investment Management," 36.
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poor, producing less return on investments. These situations
create an even greater need for corporate funds to offset total
pension costs.
Some examples of the effect of pension costs on earnings
are: (l) in 1969, Western Electric Company contributed $128
million to its pension plan - more than half as much as that
year's total profit, and (2) in 1970, American Airlines showed
a loss of Si. 30 per share, but it would have been a profit of
.50 per share if the company had not been obligated to contri-
bute $37 million to its pension fund to meet actuarial require-
11 1 "
ments. Table 8 indicates the proportionate size of a random
sampling of pension fund contributions of some major U. S.
corporations for the year 1969. It is obvious that in each
case the pension fund of the corporation is a major operation
within the corporate structure of its organization, and more
than likely is getting more than just token attention in its
2
administration and management.
The extent to which a company is able to meet its
pension costs from annual contributions and return on assets
alone is extremely important to the markets and the nation.
During extremely adverse market and economic conditions, when
both corporate profits and return on investments are both
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RANDOM SAMPLE OF PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS














U.S. Steel 217 72.6 33.5
IBM 933 108.0 11.6
Texas Instruments 33 8.2 24.8
Standard Oil
(N.J.) 1,245 48.6 3.9
Johnson & Johnson 58 6.2 10.7
Eastman Kodak 400 56.4 14.1
Cutler Hammer 6 3.2 53.3
Clark Equipment 38 8.4 22.1
Brunswick 14 3.0 21.4
Caterpillar
Tractor 142 30.5 21.5




forced to liquidate large portions of their pension fund
assets to meet current needs. This basic conversion of the
private pension system from net accumulator of capital to
net dissipator could have far-reaching and chaotic effects
on the financial community. What may be even more detrimental
is the case where pension liabilities are made binding by union
contract or by legislation, in which instance the company may
be compelled to even sell off corporate assets in order to
meet claims.
The possibility of all the above events occurring are
admittedly rare. Usually pension obligations have no claim
on corporate assets, and many large, well-managed companies
can owe their pension funds certain amounts of money, waiting
for conditions to improve before making additional contribu-
tions. This does not matter when the company is strong and
durable, but it is hard on employees of companies that go
broke or merge, and every year about 30,000 people lose out
2
on pensions because their companies go out of business. The
aforementioned Studebaker affair was a prime mover toward
stricter government regulation and reform to prevent this
very thing from happening.
"'"Gumperz, "Pension Funds in an Age of Discontinuity,"
119.
Burck, "That Ever Expanding Pension Balloon," 130.

CHAPTER V
OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT
Very few people doubt the sincerity of the majority
of present corporate management in their efforts to improve
the pension fund system as it now exists, and, probably
because these systems are wholly voluntary they have been
subjected to relatively little regulation and control.
Considering this lack of regulation, the fact that there have
been so few cases of mismanagement or manipulation is quite
surprising. Most of the funds are scrupulously managed by
trustees who are highly dependable and ethical, but in some
instances corporations have borrowed from their funds, or
tried to control companies whose stock they own. Also, in
a few banks and insurance companies that manage funds,
decisions about investing the funds' assets are influenced
by the interests of some other department.
The recent United Mine Workers case is perhaps the
most flagrant example of abuse of management responsibility.
The U.M.W. fund was managed by so called "trustees" who
employed friends and relatives of union officers. Also, it




accumulated up to 878 million and kept this cash in non-interest
bearing deposits in a bank which was controlled by the union as
majority stockholder. The courts found the union and the
"trustees" guilty of neglecting their obligation to the fund's
beneficiaries by failing to develop a coherent investment
policy. The case is still the subject of much discussion in
government circles.
Such are the reasons for the increased attention and
concern on the part of legislators for increased government
involvement and control in the nation's pension and welfare
system. Recommendations for reform have varied from minor
reform of the present system to a complete government take-over
of pension responsibility and administration.
In the latter regard, many influential people in
Washington, including members of Congress, have voiced their
opinion that they believe that social security can perform the
function of distributing pension benefits much better, more
efficiently, and more equitably than privately managed funds.
They argue that private pension plans do not cover all the
workers, discriminate against low-paid and temporary workers,
are wasteful, and exert the wrong economic pressures. They
therefore argue that in order to achieve the true objective
of a universal pension system the nation must integrate all
2





There have been many recommendations and bills
presented by Congressmen to regulate the pension funds.
The main provisions of the pending legislation concern
the subjects of vesting, portability, minimum funding
standards, and the establishment of a mandatory system of
insurance of benefits in the event of involuntary plan
termination. The latter two subjects are self-explanatory,
but vesting and portability should be explained.
Vesting is the guarantee of pension benefits to an
employee who has worked a specified number of years or
reaches a certain age, even if no longer with the company.
If a plan is fully vested after 15 years of service, a 20
year old worker could leave the job as early as age 35 and
count on collecting his deferred pension credits from his
old employer when he fully retired at age 65.
Portability would enable the employee to transfer his
claims, whether vested or not, from one place of employment
to another, no matter how frequently he may change employment
during his lifetime. Without vesting or portability, a worker
could conceivably work for three or four companies during his
"working life and still be entitled to no benefits except for
social security. All these companies could have employee
pension plans, but because of the lack of vesting and portability
provisions, the worker would have suffered irreparable loss of
pension benefits.
A recent House bill, submitted by Representative Dent of
Pennsylvania, calls for strict standards of fiduciary responsi-
bility, full vesting in 10 years, and the funding of past service
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liabilities over twenty-five years in the case of companies
who presently do not have a pension plan but will incorporate
one. The bill also proposes to establish federally administrated
insurance (sometimes called reinsurance), paid for by employers,
against the loss of vested pension benefits when a company goes
out of business or otherwise suddenly terminates its plan.
A Senate measure, sponsored by Senator Jacob Javits of
New York, differs from the Dent bill mainly in that it would
vest 10 per cent of a participant's credits after six years of
aggregate service and 10 per cent a year thereafter. Senator
Javits also proposes voluntary portability for employees, and
the setting up of a government commission which would administer
all pension laws, thus superseding the Internal Revenue Service
p
and the Labor Department.
In addition to the above legislation, President Nixon
himself has made proposals of his own. In addition to the tax
deductions of up to $1500 contributed to an individual's own
retirement fund, he has proposed raising the ceilings on annual
tax deductions to 15 per cent of earned income or $7500, which-
ever is lower, in the cases of self-employed persons (Keogh
Plan). With regard to the private pension plans, the President's
measure would require 50 per cent vesting after age and years of
service totaled 50, and another 10$ would be added each year
until the employee was fully vested. '
""•Ibid., 131.
2Ibid.
^United Business Service, United Opinion Prom Washington ,
December 27, 1971, p. 514.
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The above proposals, both by the Congress and the
President, are bound to meet with some objection from most
businesses and even labor unions. The biggest defect of the
reform bills, and a defect that is probably agreed upon by
both labor and management, is that they would do nothing
about the most important deficiency of private pensions:
being voluntary. Private pensions now cover only about half
of all employees in the private economy, and if private pensions
are ever to fulfill a social role, they must be expanded to
cover nearly all the working population.
Most other opposition to the reforms has come from
businesses that operate or administer private pension plans.
The increased standards for fund management and disclosure
would add relatively little to pension costs, but liberalized
requirements on vesting, funding, portability, and reinsur-
ance would be so expensive that they would possibly squeeze
private pension plans out of business. The fear of management
is that if this were to happen, the private pension plans would
be replaced by a rambling, expensive, inefficient, Federal
bureaucracy, probably under the Social Security System. Of
course, business is also highly concerned over the possibility
2
of Federal regulation of their now largely unregulated domain.
Would turning over the private pension system to the
government solve all the stated problems? Probably not. Social
Security is now operated on a pay-as-you-go basis: it taxes
Burck, "That Ever Expanding Pension Balloon," 134.
o
United Business Service, United Opinion From Washington ,
October 12, 1971, p. 404.

74
payrolls and distributes the money as pensions and ottie'r
benefits. If pensions were to be raised, the social security
tax rate would also have to be raised considerably, seriously
affecting the spendable income of lower-paid workers. Also,
if pension business were shifted to social security, these
funds would be no more and would not be available in the
marketplace. To the extent that the government chose to
fund social security, it would invest in its own bonds, and
business would have to raise even more of its capital intern-
ally than it does now, or might even have to turn to the
government itself for capital.
Despite all the objections and shortcomings of the
proposed bills, nearly everyone concerned is resigned and
reconciled to the idea that some sort of legislative action
will be passed by Congress in the next few years. Mandatory
vesting, stricter funding requirements and some sort of
reinsurance look inevitable in a period of time in our
history when pensions are looked upon more as a right than
a privilege.
Legislation is almost certain to come in the area
of disclosure by the funds. Present disclosure laws create
only a mass of meaningless documents submitted to the Labor
Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission. It
is universally felt that sponsors should be required to tell
participants exactly what benefits are due them, when they
are due, what options are available to them, and the conse-
quences to them in the event they decide to change jobs.
Burck, "That Ever Expanding Pension Balloon," 102.
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Strict disclosure, not . only to employees, but also to the
government, will almost assuredly also be enacted. At
present there is only minimal requirements for the companies
to report and account for the vast sums of money in their
pension funds. Congress is probably long overdue in providing
some effective supervision of the pension funds that so many
workers are dependent upon.
Labor is obviously pushing these reforms and businesses
don't have much solid ground to stand on in their rebuttals.
Their only hope is that Congress will not attempt to transform
the whole system overnight and not to make requirements so
strict that the pension funds may be wiped out rather than
strengthened.
WHAT LIES AHEAD
Pension funds have made great gains in the past 20
years, with not only assets increasing markedly, but benefits
paid to retirees also having greatly expanded. With inflation,
union demands, government concern, and individual employee
requests all continually increasing, it is by no means con-
ceivable that this tremendous past rate of growth will lesson
to any extent.
There have been many estimates made as to how many
workers will be covered, what benefits will be, and what total
pension fund assets will be 10 or 15 years hence, but all these
Business Week, Tighter Rules For Pensions , Editorial,
September 11, 1971, 133.
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items depend greatly on which avenue of reform the government
decides to take in its efforts toward new legislation concerning
private pension funds. That the mentioned categories will
increase is beyond doubt, the ultimate question is how much?
Average estimates of the size of pension funds in the year 1980
are total assets of approximately $225-$250 billion, with annual
payout of $9 billion to approximately 6.6 million annuitants.
These figures compare with $125 billion, $6 billion, and 4.2
million pensioners respectively in 1970.
It is not unlikely that future retirement income objectives
will be in range of 75/^-100^ of final average wage or salary,
compared to about 40$ today. This goal reflects society's
continuing emphasis to guaranteeing that living standards attained
by an individual during his working life be, by and large, main-
tained during his years of retirement. Retirement income, in this
sense, is the combination of pension and social security payments.
So, as social security benefits are enlarged, the less the private
pension plan will have to pay, assuming there will be some tie-in
of pension plans to social security. This does not offer much
hope for corporate pension costs because social security contri-
butions, by employer and employee, are already fast approaching
the limits of tolerability, and prospects of greatly increased
social security benefits are not too promising at the present
time.
1Employee Benefit Plan Review, Professors Dote on
Establishing Criteria, But Practitioners Somewhat Less
Enthusiastic , February, 1968 <. P. S, and Business Week, Pressure
on Pension Funds to Perform , 88.
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With these factors in mind, the burden falls on the
private pension system to come upon desirable directions in
which to move in order to prevent a collapse of the entire
system. Primary among all future considerations is that
pension funds are very important to all concerned and that
long-range strategic planning will have to become standard
procedure instead of haphazard and short term. The possible
options which are generally considered available to assist in
the funding of private pension plans are listed below, but as
will be seen^ they all have limitations or disadvantages, to
either the employee or to management.
1. Variable Annuities . Under this option, between
one-third and one-half of pension benefits would be allowed
to vary with returns on fund assets. This is not desirable
for the workers because most workers would rather have definite
benefits which can be counted on, and would permit variability
of benefits if they varied in only one direction - up.
2. Increased Employer Contributions . Since most
companies already are suffering from a profit squeeze,
increased contributions by the employer might even turn
profits into deficits, which would result in a lowering
of economic activity.
3. Increased Employee Contributions . Labor unions
obviously oppose this since they insist that providing
retirement benefits is the sole obligation of employers.
However, there may be some increase in this area if the
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employee contributions can be made tax-deductible, as
proposed recently by the President.
4-. Pension Insurance . This can take the form either
of (1) having the insurance company assume responsibility for
paying specified benefits in return for the premiums paid by
the employer or, (2) reinsuring the fund the employer himself
accumulates. Either system would be acceptable, except that
regular premium costs for the employer would be extremely
costly, much more so than the costs involved for the same
benefits that self-funding would require.
5. Aggressive Investment Policies . Since the above
four options are all with their own limitations, pension fund
trustees have eagerly turned to this option as a means of
offsetting increased costs. The advantages, disadvantages,
and possibilities of this approach have been discussed in
this paper, but it also is not without its own limitations.
The problems, possible solutions, implications, and
consequences of an adequate or inadequate pension system in
this country have been brought to the surface, concentrating
on the corporate pension system. Where the government, manage-
ment, and labor proceed from here only time will tell, but it
is hoped that all parties concerned start moving in what is
hoped to be the right direction, not only soon, but cautiously
and rationally. The well being of our older citizens and




The realization of the need for a pension system for
the nation's workers did not develop until late in the
nineteenth century, and for over 50 years after the
establishment of the first plan, progress was indeed slow.
The fact that industry, the railroads, and labor unions
devised their own plans long before the federal government's
Social Security Act in 1935 perhaps explains this slow growth
of private or public pension plans. Since that time, public
and private plans have grown tremendously, with both costs .
and benefits expanding at an extremely fast pace every year.
Historically, as far as the corporate pension plan is
concerned, the company owners (employers) have borne the cost
of all pension fund programs, and generally speaking, this
should be the case in the future. However, with the costs
of pension programs talcing a greater percentage of corporate
earnings than ever before, the prospect of substantial
contributions from the employees themselves is increasing.
The demand for increased benefits after retirement, plus
the government's acknowledgement of the substantial costs
to the employer by its recommended tax relief for all con-




participation by pensioners, despite the lack of support for
contributory plans by the labor unions.
In establishing the framework for corporate pension
plans, the administrators and managers of these funds must
consider many facets before deciding what the actual long
term objectives and policies are going to be. It is imperative
that the conflicting interests of the pensioners and shareholders
be balanced as well as possible, hopefully to the approval of
both groups. Various constraints, implications, trends, and
possible consequences all have to be delved into at great length
before the selection of investment advisors and investment
performance criteria is undertaken.
The increasing importance of pension fund assets, not
only to the employer, but to the employee as well, has brought
about a shift in the original thinking as to the proper place
for the pension program in the corporate structure. It has
become apparent that the pension program is as much a user of
capital as any other division of the company, and thus can
contribute it's share of profits (or losses). This has resulted
in more attention being devoted to these assets, with the
investment policies shifting from the conservative end of the
continuum to the more aggressive, highly diversified end, as
far as investment portfolios are concerned.
Corporate pension fund assets at present constitute the
largest aggregation of private capital in the United States,
and with the changing trustee emphasis toward performance,
these funds will have greater and greater influence on stock
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market movements as the trend toward equity investment
continues. Not only is the cost factor of pension funds
instrumental in the shift to common equities for greater
possible return, but the employee retention aspect is
equally as important. Today's changing society has
become extremely welfare-oriented and employees are not
only requesting higher benefits, but demanding them, and
threatening change of jobs if the pension plan of a firm
is not adequate. A pension plan that adequately provides
the benefits demanded by employees and labor unions is
extremely costly, almost forcing the company to seek
ever-higher returns on investments.
A firm can pursue these high returns in many ways,
but the definite trend has been toward common stocks and
capital gains. Despite this more aggressive investment
posture, the average private pension plan's investment
performance has not performed as well as most stock indices,
and certainly not as well as might be expected. This may be
expected to change as the pension trusts become able to liquidate
low yielding investments that are not matured yet and have locked
in funds for many years. Nevertheless, trustees for these funds
v/ill continue to be under great pressure to increase total rates
of return in order to reduce not only pension costs, but their
impact on earnings as well.
The occurrence of a few unethical and improper practices,
along with some corporate business failures, has prompted the
federal government and individual legislators to propose drastic
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reforms for private pension programs. Stricter rules on
disclosure of pension information by employers, provisions
for vesting and portability of pension benefits, reinsurance
of benefits, and other reforms all will increase pension costs
considerably and may even force the corporate pension plans
out of existence. The prospect of a completely government-
controlled pension program for all citizens is not outside
the realm of possibility, but is considered to be highly
detrimental to the country's financial markets as well as
to the free enterprise system.
It will take the efforts of all concerned to correct
the present ills of the private pension program and to improve
the system for future retirees. The federal government must
propose reforms, but must also be careful not to force too
many obligations on the companies all at once. The major
burden falls on corporate management. Business will have to
improve efficiency, select capable fund managers and provide
the financial planning and investment criteria necessary to
make pension assets truly productive capital. Employees and
labor unions will be compelled not only to temper their wage
and pension demands, but to also do their utmost to increase
the over-all productivity of the nation's industrial capacity.
Only with all these groups working toward the same goals
will the nation's private pension system become not only
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